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‘Morality’ and ‘ethics’ are rarely distinguished but, when they are, it is sometimes said
that morality addresses the question, in the context of a set of codified norms, ‘What
must I do?’, whereas ethics addresses the broader question, ‘How should I live?’1 Even in
these formulations, which are controversial and expressed differently in different writers,
it is clear that both morality and ethics refer to the domain of individual deliberation and
choice. It is always the individual who faces moral or ethical questions such as, ‘Should I
pay my taxes?’ ‘Should I have an abortion?’ ‘Should I torture this prisoner?’ These ques-
tions are related to but distinguishable from questions of political philosophy, which also
involve deliberation and choice but in which the decision-making relates to the collective
affairs of the polis: Is the taxation system just? Should there be an entitlement to choose
whether or not to have an abortion? Should torture by state actors be permitted on some
occasions? Obviously, given that individuals live in society, there is overlap and interde-
pendence between the individual and collective domains, but an important distinction in
normative philosophy remains.
Michael Sandel’s new book, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?, is a primer based
on the author’s undergraduate survey course at Harvard on the philosophy of justice.
The course has also spawned an interactive website and a television series. Given its
introductory nature, it is somewhat surprising that the book does not bring the
fundamental distinction between moral and political philosophy into sharper relief.
Indeed, the book’s title—in the currently dominant Western philosophical tradition in
English at least—tends to evoke ideas of ‘social justice’, whereas the sub-title is a question
that, in ordinary English, denotes most commonly a choice facing an individual. Sandel
refers to moral argument as ‘a dialectic between our judgments about particular situations
and the principles we affirm on reflection’ (28) and he observes that when moral reflect-
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ion ‘turns political’ it ‘needs some engagement with the tumult of the city, with the
arguments and incidents that roil the public mind’ (29). Engagement with public
argument—with ‘the tumult of the city’—is indeed a defining element of political
reflection, and this means that the moral experience of being human and addressing
questions of justice is qualitatively different depending on whether one is facing a choice
concerning one’s own situation or concerning appropriate social or political policy. There
may even be cases where tensions or conflicts arise between our individual and our social
choices; ‘No, the taxation system is not just but, yes, I should pay my taxes’ is a common
example. Another aspect of the distinction is that a moral question within the social
domain is asked by each person individually and not by a collectivity. Even if a decision
is to be taken following a vote among members, each member faces the individual moral
question as to how they should vote.
It might be said that one benefit of Sandel’s tendency to conflate the two domains is
that it allows his considerable rhetorical skills freer range. Justice is written in an extremely
accessible style; typically, the author draws the reader in by presenting vivid stories—
often well-known ‘issues of the day’ but also fictional dilemmas, personal anecdotes and
experiences from the lives of philosophers—as frameworks within which to assess
philosophical problems. For example, in his discussion of the role of consent in creating
a morally binding obligation, Sandel refers to the trading of baseball cards between his two
sons when they were young; to David Hume’s refusal, as a landlord, to pay for repairs
undertaken unilaterally by a subtenant; and to a newspaper story concerning an elderly
woman in Chicago facing a $50,000 plumbing bill for the repair of a leaky toilet. Many
of the examples that bring this book to life are decidedly ethical dilemmas. Should one
allow, for example, a runaway trolley to kill five workers on a railway track, or divert it
onto another track where it would kill only one person? Other dilemmas introduced by
Sandel raise issues with a definite social or political remit. Should United States citizenship
be available for sale, for example, or should the law mandate affirmative action programs? 
One of the effects of Sandel’s blurring of the distinction between the ethical and the
political is occasionally to muddy the waters regarding precisely what type of ‘justice’
forms the subject of the book taken as a whole. Political philosophy, and in particular
‘social’ or ‘distributive’ justice, is the stated primary concern. Early on Sandel observes that
a just society distributes valued goods such as income and wealth, duties and rights,
powers and opportunities, and offices and honours, ‘in the right way; it gives each person
his or her due’, but, he notes, the ‘hard questions’ begin ‘when we ask what people are due,
and why’ (19). The book’s aim, ostensibly at least, is to present three different traditions
in normative philosophy—those based broadly on welfare, freedom, and virtue—and
examine their responses to these ‘hard questions’. While political philosophy cannot
resolve our disagreements, Sandel writes, it can ‘give shape to the arguments we have,
and bring moral clarity to the alternatives we confront as democratic citizens’ (19); Justice
is ‘a journey in moral and political reflection’ that invites readers to ‘subject their own
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views about justice to critical examination—to figure out what they think, and why’ (30).
Justice certainly succeeds, and in some ways admirably, in encouraging and facilitating
this type of reflection, but it is not neutral with regard to the three approaches. It seeks
to demonstrate the inadequacies first of utilitarian accounts of justice and then of theories
of justice based on freedom, rights and fairness; the reader is thus led dialectically to
Sandel’s preferred synthesis—‘As you’ve probably guessed by now’, he writes, ‘I prefer a
version of the third approach’ (260)—that is, theories that see justice as bound up with
virtue and the good life. 
Sandel rejects utilitarian justice in brief and familiar terms: Bentham’s approach is
defective because it makes justice a matter of calculation rather than principle, and
because, ‘by trying to translate all human goods into a single, uniform measure of value,
it flattens them, and takes no account of the qualitative differences among them’ (260);
Mill’s philosophy can save utilitarianism from the charge that it reduces everything to a
crude calculus, but ‘only by invoking a moral ideal of human dignity and personality
independent of utility itself ’ (56). Theories of justice such as those of Nozick, Kant and
Rawls adopt a principled approach but ultimately, according to Sandel’s account, they
too fall down because they ‘don’t require us to question or challenge the preferences and
desires we bring to public life’ (261). This generalisation is likely to raise hackles from
many quarters; it overlooks, perhaps most obviously, the fundamental orientation in Kant
that one ought to act taking account of others.
The virtue-based approach advocated in Justice is an elaboration of the philosophical
communitarianism developed by Alisdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor
and—particularly in his 1982 book, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice2—Sandel himself.
One of the main targets of the communitarian critique was the atomistic individualism
associated with thinkers like Rawls, to whom Sandel refers as having given American
liberalism ‘its fullest philosophical expression’ (220). In Justice there is outright rejection
of the ‘veil of ignorance’ in Rawls’s contractarianism because, for Sandel and the
communitarians, the self is the personhood that shapes our identity as moral agents and,
as such, it cannot be abstracted from our individual sense of values: ‘A just society can’t
be achieved simply by maximizing utility or by securing freedom of choice. To achieve a
just society we have to reason together about the meaning of the good life … Justice is not
only about the right way to distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things’
(261).
A theory of virtue ethics necessarily includes an account of the purpose or telos of
human life. Sandel remarks that for Aristotle the highest end of political association is to
cultivate the virtue of citizens and he suggests that arguments about justice are,
‘unavoidably, arguments about the good life’ (215). Sandel’s positive proposal is a set of
themes for a ‘new politics of the common good’ (263). One theme includes finding ‘a
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way to cultivate in citizens a concern for the whole, a dedication to the common good’;
he instances positively the scheme whereby students receive help with college tuition in
exchange for hours of public service and is favourably disposed to ‘more ambitious
proposals for mandatory national service’ (264). Another suggestion is based on concerns
about ‘marketizing social practices’ as in the operation of for-profit prison companies
and proposals to sell citizenship; these, says Sandel, ‘may corrupt or degrade the norms
that define them’ and therefore ‘we need to ask what non-market norms we want to
protect from market intrusion’ (265). He also makes the often-overlooked point, while
advancing the theme of ‘inequality, solidarity, and civic virtue’, that focusing on the civic
consequences of inequality, and ways of reversing them, ‘might find political traction that
arguments about income distribution as such do not’ (267–8). 
Sandel is short on detail in relation to these themes, but more significant is the deep
conceptual flaw in his analysis of the common good. Like many communitarians, he
seems to imagine that the common good is a substantive aim or goal that can and should
be common to everyone. In fact no social outcome—that is, no particular configuration
of the social order—is an aim or goal common to all. The common good is best thought
of as a framework that allows people to pursue their individual and collective goals in
community. For St Thomas Aquinas, in the Aristotelian tradition, the common good is
simply the maintenance of peaceful and civil society in which humans can, for the most
part, live their lives in peace and mutual respect. This sensible and realistic view of the
common good is found in other writers too. Thomas Hobbes’ theory of civil society
includes an understanding of law’s function in maintaining a peaceful social order that
is, perhaps surprisingly, similar to that of St Thomas. Hobbes suggested that humans were
motivated to seek such order by the ‘Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary
to commodious living; and a Hope by their means to obtain them’.3 On this view, the
desire for what allows a good life and the hope of being able to live it are the desire and
hope for the common good.4
Sandel’s communitarianism is a substantive vision of the common good that has
strong patriotic and emotional elements, captured for example in his invocation of the
memory of Robert Kennedy and the spirit of Barack Obama’s presidential campaign to
preface his core common good argument, and by his suggestion that forms of mandatory
national service should replace the public school and the military as a ‘site of civic
education’ that would cultivate in citizens the aforementioned ‘dedication to the common
good’ (263–4). This theory is built in and for the discrete polis that is the United States;
indeed, the references and examples that are chosen occasionally make Justice read more
like a book about the US than about justice theory. Communitarians have argued
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traditionally that the standards of justice must be found in particular forms of communal
life and tradition, but some have engaged constructively with inter-communal and
transnational justice debates. Charles Taylor, for example, in the debate about cultural
differences and human rights, proposed a cross-cultural dialogue between representatives
of different traditions that would allow participants to learn from the ‘moral universe’ of
others.5 In contrast, Sandel, in defending so staunchly a communal conception of virtue,
is left without a viable foundation for his purportedly general theory of justice. 
Consider Sandel’s discussion of Marcus Luttrell’s 2007 book, Lone Survivor.6 In 2005
Luttrell was part of a United States Navy SEAL unit operating behind enemy lines in
Afghanistan that came across some unarmed goatherds. Luttrell and three colleagues were
faced with the dilemma as to whether or not they should kill the goatherds, even though
they had not done anything hostile, or let them go and take the risk that they would warn
the Taliban. After one colleague abstained Luttrell cast a deciding vote to release the
goatherds. The Taliban subsequently killed all three of Luttrell’s colleagues, as well as 16
soldiers sent in a helicopter to rescue the SEAL team. Looking back, Luttrell suggests that
he should have killed the goatherds; Sandel finds it difficult to disagree and observes that
the case for killing them is strong ‘because we suspect that—given the outcome—they
were not innocent bystanders, but Taliban sympathizers’ (26). Sandel’s justice theory
interprets this case as solely a matter of partisan military ethics and ignores the range of
political issues raised by the very presence of United States military forces in Afghanistan;
when Sandel does consider the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq directly he does so only in
the context of political debates regarding military service in the United States. 
In this work there are underlying assumptions about the role of ‘a strong sense of
community’ (263) in justice theory that leave no space for questions of justice beyond
borders. This may mean that Sandelian justice can be transnational only in the limited
sense of a comparative tradition, but when this shortcoming is combined with a blurring
of the divide between the ethical and the political domains, we are left with quite a myopic
as well as an ethnocentric justice theory. For example, ethics and justice would seem to
be unintelligible for Sandel as a part of diplomacy and statecraft. James Der Derian
famously adopted the ‘genealogical’ approach of interpretative history to arrive at an
understanding of diplomacy as the mediation of estrangement,7 and in his discussion of
the ethics of such mediation, Robert Toscano notes that the ‘specific profile’ of diplomacy
is as ‘choice and action’ by ‘professional mediators of international otherness’.8 Sandel’s
community-bound perspective leads only to confusion regarding the role of justice in
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such choice and action: it would seem to permit, for example, Margaret Thatcher to take
tea with a torturer and fight for releasing that torturer from the United Kingdom justice
system because he helped in the Falklands war. Indeed, given his perspective on the case
of the Afghan goatherds, Sandel may empathise with those who propose that state-
sponsored terrorism could be understood as ‘a special form of diplomacy’.9
The management (to use that term loosely) of globalisation requires, amongst other
things, creative statesmanship characterised by multicultural sensibility and clear and
concrete visions of transnational justice.10 Justice theory can be an essential part of such
an agenda, as is evident from the approach of the Indian economist and philosopher,
Amartya Sen, whose book on justice, The Idea of Justice, was published shortly before
Justice. Sandel’s approach might be said to overlap with Sen’s—they both take Rawls as a
primary reference point from which they diverge, and Sandel’s methodology fits with
Sen’s approval of the Enlightenment tradition that sought to advance the cause of justice
rather than seek theoretical perfection—but Sen’s contribution to justice theory is
transnational, cosmopolitan and pluralistic. Sen acknowledges communitarian insights
regarding the significance of variations in values between people in different communi-
ties,11 but he emphasises that the neighbourhood that is constructed by our relations with
distant people ‘has pervasive relevance to the understanding of justice in general,
particularly so in the contemporary world’12—and in an observation that applies directly
to thinkers like Sandel, Sen observes that the ‘global presence’ of non-Western thought
is ‘often overlooked or marginalized in the dominant traditions of contemporary Western
discourse’.13
Sen draws on his background in development economics in order to suggest how we
can understand and address issues of social or distributive injustice in the global context.
Whereas for Sandel the moral life aims at happiness, understood as ‘a way of being’ (197)
in accordance with a communal conception of virtue, Sen’s idea of ‘welfare’, understood
as well-being or happiness, is about the freedoms and capabilities that people actually
enjoy. Sen’s ‘capability approach’ to economics is the current paradigm for policy debate
in human development discourse and the basis for his engagements with debates about
justice that ‘relate to practicalities’—improved policy responses to famine and illiteracy
are possible, he suggests, ‘even if we are unable to identify the perfectly just’.14 One of the
central motifs of The Idea of Justice is the distinction between two classical Sanskrit words
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denoting justice: niti and nyaya. Whereas niti refers to organisational propriety and
behavioural correctness, nyaya stands for a comprehensive concept of realised justice that
is linked not to rules or institutions but rather, in line with Sen’s thought, to ‘the world
that actually emerges’.15
At the heart of The Idea of Justice is the conjoining of capability theory with the social
choice tradition associated with Borda, Condorcet and Kenneth Arrow, but Sen accepts
the ‘possible sustainability of plural and competing reasons for justice, all of which have
claims to impartiality and which nevertheless differ from—and rival—each other’.16
Whilst acknowledging that no form of reason can settle all practical or theoretical issues
of justice, Sen insists that different and competing positions, each of which can be well
defended, can be absorbed into his justice theory. This claim will not be accepted
universally. The trading order, for example, is part of an all-encompassing social order and
its intrinsic fluidity and variability impedes the ranking capacity of even refined versions
of social choice theory. Another difficulty is that in Sen’s account of rational choice theory
there is an unnecessary conflation of choice and subsequent reflection on choice—at one
level of analysis, to be ‘rational maximizers’, in the sense of choosing what seems good and
preferable to us at the time, is not what we choose to be, it is what we inescapably are.
However, not all of the theoretical consequences typically (and often lazily) associated
with this latter view are inevitable.17 Nonetheless, in advancing so eloquently and so
comprehensively the principle of pluralism in social justice theory, Sen may yet have an
influence on the subject to rival that of Rawls. 
From the perspective of justice theory generally, there remains the shared limitation
in Sandel and Sen that they are both preoccupied unduly, and from a methodological
point of view unsoundly, with social or distributive justice. When Sandel states that a just
society distributes goods ‘in the right way; it gives each person his or her due’ (19), he does
not remark that this description of a just society reflects the Roman law definition of
justice in Justinian’s Institutes: ‘Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique
tribuens’—‘The virtue of justice is the constant and enduring will to render to each what
is due’. And although Sandel’s communitarianism draws on Aristotelian virtue ethics, he
does not consider the Aristotelian-Roman law-Thomist tradition of law and justice, in
which, as the Roman law definition indicates, justice is itself a virtue. The Roman idea that
justice is the rendering to each what is due understands justice as involving a method of
enquiry that does not indicate what is due to whom; what is due to whom must be
discovered by investigating the particular case or generally by considering types of cases.18
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In this approach justice is also about ‘the right way to value things’, but such valuation
remains to be discovered in light of such investigations and their relation to types of
justice.
Aristotle (who, it may be argued, presupposed what later became the Roman defi-
nition of justice) and St Thomas Aquinas (who, effectively, adopted the Roman definition)
distinguished between natural and conventional justice. What is naturally just is dis-
covered through an intelligent and reasonable examination of the actual situation or case.
The search for what is intrinsic to the situation or case discovers that pacta sunt servanda
is intrinsic to promise-making, for example, and that it is intrinsic to ownership and the
practice of borrowing and lending that what is borrowed ought to be returned. Con-
ventional justice is that which may be settled legally or by agreement. The fundamentals
of contract law express what is naturally just, but many of its details are jurisdiction-
specific and conventional (for example, whether an agreement, in order to be a valid
contract, must be written or not). The same can be said for the rule a library lays down
as to when a borrowed book must be returned: it is natural that the book be returned, but
loan periods vary from book to book and from library to library. The other Aristotelian
classification of justice is usually taken to be the distinction between distributive justice—
when shares in what is commonly owned are justly allocated—and rectificatory or
commutative justice—when what, rightly or wrongly, is held by a non-owner is returned
to its owner; but it is often either overlooked or disputed that Aristotle identifies another
type of justice, reciprocal justice, as the justice at work in exchange or trading.19
Sandel does not analyse (and nor does Sen) the distinction between natural and
conventional justice, or the categories of rectificatory and reciprocal justice. Sandel seems
to think, for example, that the scheme whereby students receive help with college tuition
in return for hours of public service is a matter of social or distributive justice, which it
is not. It is an instance of exchange and ought to be considered in the context of reciprocal
justice. The narrow focus on social or distributive justice is a shortcoming of many a
justice theory; in Sandel’s case its most negative effect is the way it allows ‘ethics’, ‘politics’
and ‘the common good’ to all collapse into a vaguely defined but partisan sense of comm-
unal ‘virtue’ that somehow represents ‘justice’. 
Overall, and despite its many flaws, Sandel’s Justice contributes to discussions of
important social and political questions as well as to the broader question of how such
issues may be addressed productively in a community. When Sandel calls for a ‘more
robust public engagement with our moral disagreements’ (268), he echoes Ronald
Dworkin’s concern at the absence in the US of ‘even the beginnings of a decent public
argument about [human rights, religion, and taxes, among many other issues]’.20 Perhaps
the greatest contribution Justice makes is to encourage such a ‘robust’ public culture, such
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a ‘decent’ public argument, in the United States—and possibly, as a comparative contri-
bution, elsewhere too. Within its self-imposed confines it encourages and facilitates
dialogue about what sort of society people want to live in. This is not a complex book, and
the combination of Sandel’s clear, accessible style and his scholarly insight will provoke,
constructively and enjoyably, the thoughts of the general reader as well as students of
jurisprudence, political philosophy and, albeit to a lesser extent, ethics. 
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